Trojan horse of `Temperature is Emergent'

This dogma is so strong that has been actively obstructing any significant progress in understanding heat since Boltzmann. If you take away this dogma from physicists almost all of pop-science books become empty. It provides a `soft warm pillow' for a dream so sweet that awakening the academic sheep from it requires a fully fledged war, a revolution. 

Almost any topic on emergence anywhere, whether `philosophy' or biology or neuroscience, begins with emergence of temperature and goes like this 

`This quantity is an emergent one, just like temperature' 

Temperature is the prime example of `emergence' for the establishment and it is so serious that some of the bloated windbags like Verlinde have tried to `epidemize' the madness to whole physics but in fact have done nothing other than fallacious rhetoric: Current definition of temperature/entropy as an emergent quantity is circular. I have been saying this for quite some time but physicists --as it is usual-- continue ignoring this either totally or by silly `reasons' like `temperature is only defined for equilibrium' (e.g. Rovelli, private correspondence). The best answer I got from a journal (Europhysics Letters) was this:

Your paper deals very much with philosophical aspects of the concept of temperature and entropy, and as such would be more suitable for a different journal dealing with philosophical aspects of the fundamental laws of physics. 

--Christian Beck 

And of course, you can guess the result of submitting it to journals dealing with `philosophical aspects of fundamental laws of physics': ~`You are dealing with physical aspects of fundamental laws of physics'. 

As long as we ignore this very important point about heat, no progress can be expected on the question of arrow of time: There is no emergence in fundamental physics, and more, there cannot be any. A simple description of the problem is given here.

Analogy as an epistemological guiding principle

The origin of analogy as an epistemological principle goes back to Electromagnetism. The two theories of electricity and magnetism were found to behave so similarly that various concepts in one was inspired by an analogous concept in the other. The analogy worked so well that it resulted in the remarkable success of Maxwell's Electromagnetism. The belief in the analogy was further strengthened when Dirac found that assuming the existence of magnetic monopoles it is possible to --partly-- explain the quantisation of electric charge.

Many advances in physics are result of comparison and analogy. The naturally arising question thus is whether this `principle of analogy' is a useful --if not true-- principle for epistemology.

The reason this question interests me is that I find in various reflections, analogy is a quite powerful tool leading to fruitful results; it would not be wrong if I say I have been able to construct the whole of already-existing physics for myself following this principle. Is it the old mysterious unity of nature which empowers this principle? I do not know yet.